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In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540, which acknowledged the 
non-state acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a security threat and called on member 
states to implement “appropriate effective” domestic trade controls. The United States, however, 
has both promoted the multilateral implementation of international trade controls but has also 
increasingly resorted to extraterritorial enforcement of its counterproliferation rules. How can a 
multilateral, norms-based international regime like 1540 contend with extraterritorial 
enforcement based on national interests? We argue that increased U.S. extraterritorial 
counterproliferation policies are a consequence of the inconsistent implementation of resolution 
1540, adaptive and resilient proliferation networks, and a history of expanding legal 
interpretations of jurisdiction. We find that while U.S. extraterritorial enforcement can 
effectively disrupt networks hiding in overseas jurisdictions, doing so creates disincentives for 
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In 2004, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which 
obligates member states to prevent non-state actors from acquiring, developing, or using 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. This decision was 
significant for several reasons. First, the Security Council adopted the resolution under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter—meaning that compliance with the resolution’s 
requirements is mandatory, whereas past treaties and regimes were voluntary. Second, the 
resolution not only recognized that the ad hoc system of global WMD-related supply-side 
controls, at that time, was inadequate to address the threats posed by non-state actors but 
also emphasized the need for cooperation and coordination at both national and 
international levels. Since its adoption, the resolution has become a cornerstone of the 
global nonproliferation regime; addressing important gaps in global supply-side controls. 
Almost fifteen years after the adoption of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, and despite the resolution’s legally-binding obligations, 
significant technical outreach, training, and capacity-building efforts, overall 
implementation and enforcement of the resolution's provisions continue to vary 
significantly by country. Consequently, proliferators have exploited implementation 
variance in order to illicitly procure dual-use goods and technologies (i.e., goods that 
have both commercial and military or WMD applications) from the global marketplace. 
North Korea, for example, has made significant progress toward its WMD and missile 
programs by exploiting weak export controls in third-party countries in order to illegally 
obtain export-controlled goods and technologies. Without an international mechanism to 
enforce compliance with the resolution, advancing the UNSCR 1540 agenda has tended 
to be driven forwards by bilateral assistance programs–and particularly those funded by 
the United States.   
While promoting greater global implementation of international supply-side 
controls, the United States has simultaneously taken an increasingly extraterritorial 
approach to counterproliferation enforcement.1 Extraterritorial enforcement is the 
practice of one country imposing its domestic laws inside the jurisdiction of another 
country, but without seeking permission. Since 2005 the United States has resorted to 
expansive extraterritorial methods, which take advantage of unique authorities and status 
within global financial and economic systems. These methods have included autonomous 
sanctions, regulatory enforcement actions, civil and criminal asset forfeitures, and 
extradition arrangements. This raises an interesting question: how does a norms-based 
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   In this article, we define counterproliferation as the national law enforcement, regulatory, 
intelligence, and defense policies that address WMD-related proliferation security threats (Carter, 2004). 
For our analysis, we focus exclusively on U.S. law enforcement and regulatory actions, which are the most 
publicly visible. That is, we do not consider the range of intelligence and defense-related enforcement 
systems, which are far less visible. 
 
 
international regime contend with national interest-based, extraterritorial enforcement 
actions?  
Through a review of the scholarship, U.S. court documents, and interviews with 
law enforcement specialists we aim to answer two key questions. First, what are the 
factors driving U.S. extraterritorial enforcement? Second, what are the knock-on effects 
and implications for global supply-side controls? To this end, this article aims to not only 
contribute to emerging scholarship on enforcement of WMD supply-side controls but 
also adds a new dimension by introducing the concept of extraterritoriality. Within this 
context, we highlight the emerging tension between an international approach to 
controlling the spread of proliferation-sensitive goods and technologies and the costs of 
pursuing national security interests vis-à-vis extraterritorial enforcement practices. This 
tension, we argue, is likely to result in U.S. counterproliferation tools becoming less 
effective in the long-term and may undermine broader nonproliferation objectives.  
The supply side of WMD counterproliferation 
The evolution of the U.S. approach to supply-side controls discussed in this article 
builds on two sub-genres of the proliferation scholarship: First, the literature on how 
states go about developing WMD; and second, the literature on supply-side controls, or 
how other states seek to prevent proliferators from obtaining WMD technologies. 
Research, by far, has focused more on the demand-side than the supply-side of WMD 
proliferation–essentially addressing why states seek WMD. Sagan (1997), for example, 
provided a seminal typology of states’ demand for WMD, based on existential security 
threats, a function of domestic politics, or as a desire for national or international 
prestige. Although there is a robust and active scholarship on why states’ pursue WMD, 
there still lacks any generalizable or unifying theory. As Narang (2016) puts it, 
"[k]nowing why states might pursue nuclear weapons … does not explain how they 
might do so" (p. 112). 
Only more recently have scholars started to consider the nuance of how states 
build their WMD programs. In general, these studies have contributed to a more nuanced 
view of the range of political pathways to a bomb, as well as the processes that states use 
to acquire necessary skills and technologies. The assumption, of course, is that 
understanding how will lead to better inhibition approaches, from forming and 
reinforcing nonproliferation norms to coercive diplomacy (Gavin, 2015). 
The focus of this work considering how states proliferate has varied in scope. 
Historically, from a policy perspective, states have viewed clandestine state-to-state 
transfers and black-market activity as the primary way that states acquire sensitive 
technologies to build WMD programs (Kemp, 2017). Consequently, supply-side controls 
(e.g., trade controls) emerged as a key nonproliferation policy. Kemp (2014), for 
example, argues that since the beginning of the atomic age, policymakers have wrongly 
believed that technological barriers to building a nuclear weapon presented an adequate 
 
 
obstacle to further proliferation. Whether or not Kemp’s argument is correct, domestic 
and international responses to states’ demand for WMD have emphasized the need to 
control the supply of WMD-related goods and technologies. In the early 2000s, however, 
it became apparent that global supply-side controls failed to address a new WMD 
proliferation threat—the rise of the non-state actor. 
One of the most important contributions to scholarship on states’ proliferation 
strategies is the recognition that more recent nuclear proliferators and aspirants have 
pursued pathways that are fundamentally different than the first nuclear weapons states. 
Einhorn (2006), for example, highlights how the United States, Soviet Union, United 
Kingdom, France, and China, “... each developed, weaponized, tested, produced, and 
deployed nuclear weapons” as soon as possible” (Einhorn, 2006, p. 495). Subsequent 
states that acquired nuclear weapons capabilities (or those that attempted to) took a 
variety of approaches—some incremental, hedging against running afoul of 
nonproliferation norms, while other more covert. 
Much of the early work on proliferation pathways assumed that state-to-state 
technology transfers, particularly sharing nuclear energy, posed a significant risk. With 
regards to civil nuclear assistance, Fuhrmann (2012, 2009; see also Holdren, 1983) has 
argued that peaceful assistance ultimately raises the risk of nuclear proliferation. Many 
believed that sharing nuclear energy technology would lower a state’s expected costs to 
build a bomb, would create an “irresistible temptation” to proliferate, and would provide 
technical and political cover for states to acquire enrichment or other weapons-related 
technologies (Holdren, 1983). Others have argued that states share sensitive technologies 
with non-nuclear weapons states for strategic advantage (Kroenig, 2010).  
New work, however, questions this conventional wisdom. As Miller (2017) 
astutely points out, however, much of the conventional wisdom about the relationships 
between civilian energy programs and nuclear weapons proliferation is incorrect. Instead, 
he finds that countries with nuclear energy programs are not more likely to proliferate, 
due in part to increased chances of detection and the costs from potential sanctions. 
As the A. Q. Khan network unraveled, fears emerged over “second-tier” 
proliferation. That is, states or entities within states who sell proliferation-sensitive goods 
and technologies on the open market (Braun & Chyba, 2004). Pakistan, for example, was 
ultimately the source of sensitive technology that made its way into North Korea, Iran, 
and Libya. By the same token, North Korea has proliferated ballistic missile technology 
to Iran, Libya, and Pakistan. While some have argued that intangibles, like tacit 
knowledge, still present a significant barrier to building a nuclear weapon (Montgomery, 
2005), others have argued the necessary technology is more readily available that 
previously thought. Kemp (2014, 2017), for example, argues that the notion that 
technically weak states proliferate through black-market activities or state-to-state 
transfers is incorrect. Instead, he shows that increased information availability about 
 
 
centrifuge technology likely had a greater effect on centrifuge production than the A. Q. 
Khan network. 
In a recent article, Narang (2016) introduced a typology of states’ strategies to 
acquire nuclear weapons: hedging, sprinting, hiding, and sheltered pursuit. According to 
Narang, a hedger “refrains from actively developing nuclear weapons but has not 
explicitly forsworn the option, putting the pieces in place for a future nuclear weapons 
program” (p. 117). States that “sprint” seek to develop nuclear capabilities as quickly as 
possible, but do not necessarily attempt to hide their efforts. Conversely, states that are 
“hiders” try to avoid detection by other states. Finally, states that pursue a “sheltered 
pursuit” strategy exploit the advantage provided by a major power to pursue nuclear 
capability (Narang, 2016, p. 122). Of course, the specific strategy or combination of 
strategies that a state pursue, according to Narang, is a function of external and domestic 
political environments. 
One implication of Narang (2016) and Einhorn’s (2006) work is that states which 
pursue covert WMD programs may lack the indigenous expertise and thus left to buy, 
barter, or steal the necessary expertise and equipment. Whereas plutonium reprocessing 
may draw international scrutiny, for example, using centrifuges to enrich uranium may be 
done in a way to obscure or hide true intentions. Consequently, states may be left to gray 
and black markets to acquire technologies that fall below export-control thresholds and 
trigger lists (Einhorn 2006, p. 493). Iran, for example, pursued a clandestine weapons 
program that at least initially relied on centrifuges and design information from the A.Q. 
Khan network. While the covert program ended in 2003, important technical aspects of 
the program continued as part of the country’s civil nuclear program—relying on dual-
use goods and technologies from foreign suppliers. Libya also attempted to covertly buy 
turn-key enrichment capabilities from the Khan network. In the past, North Korea has 
sourced advanced materials from foreign suppliers. 
Interestingly, while emerging scholarship recognizes the unique challenges of 
detecting a states’ covert WMD programs and the importance of supply-side controls, 
there is still only a nascent body of literature that addresses the processes of illicit 
procurement and its implications for policymakers. A. Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation 
network brought to light the challenges and limitations of existing export control regimes. 
His network employed layers of intermediaries, suppliers, and financiers that stretched 
from Europe and Southeast Asia to the Middle East in order to sell nuclear enrichment 
technologies, weapons plans, and other dual-use goods to Iran, Libya, and North Korea 
(Albright & Hinderstein, 2005). As Khan’s network unraveled, it was apparent that 
global export control regimes—at the time—were unprepared to deal with non-state 
WMD proliferation. Existing export control regimes, like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, were each informal, 
multilateral agreements between supplier states that provided guidelines and established 
norms for the supply of proliferation-sensitive technologies. These agreements, although 
 
 
non-legally binding, helped supplier states to fulfill their obligations spelled out in 
international nonproliferation treaties, like the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. These regimes, however, 
were not legally-binding, failed to keep pace with rapid globalization and the spread of 
dual-use goods and technologies, and ignored the emerging role of the non-state actor in 
WMD proliferation. 
By May 2003, the Bush administration had started to explore options to address 
non-state WMD proliferation. One of the first efforts was the U.S.-led Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), which is a non-binding agreement between members that 
outlined a broad set of principles to interdict shipments potentially related to WMD 
trafficking. Initially only 40 members, PSI membership now totals 105. As Tobey (2018, 
p. 18) points out, however, although PSI improved coordination and communication 
between international counterproliferation efforts, it did not address several legal 
challenges. Namely, most states did not have adequate domestic legislation that 
criminalized activities associated with non-state WMD proliferation. Some Bush 
administration officials believed that states should treat WMD trafficking the same way 
as piracy on the high seas (Sokolski, 2003, p. 9). That is, states have the right to address 
piracy irrespective of national jurisdiction. Thus, from the beginning, there was a tension 
between recognizing the need for multilateral approaches and domestic pressures to take 
more unilateral actions. 
Eventually, Bush administration officials moved to put forward a UN resolution 
that would mandate countries to address WMD proliferation threats by requiring states to 
criminalize the proliferation of WMD and to put into place national export control 
systems. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004—a legally-
binding resolution that recognized the need to address the problem of non-state actors, 
like terrorist groups and trafficking networks. Specifically, UNSCR 1540 requires that 
states, “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor 
to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons and their means of delivery” (United Nations Security Council, 
2004a, paragraph 2).  UNSCR 1540 effectively “replaces a de facto norm of behavior 
with a de jure legal requirement” (Stinnett, Early, Horne, & Karreth, 2011, p. 312).  
At the time of the resolution’s adoption, then President of the UN Security 
Council, Gunter Pleuger, noted that the “... proactive cooperation of all Member states, 
the public, private industry, and international agencies was a prerequisite for its success.” 
He went on to say that, “In case of any lack in [the Resolution’s] implementation, the 
resolution did not foresee any unilateral enforcement measures” (as cited in United 
Nations Security Council, 2004b). Thus from the onset, many criticized the conceptual 
inconsistencies between the resolution’s legal underpinning and the flexibility with 
respect to implementation in its operative paragraphs. Although the Security Council had 
the opportunity to choose an “enforcement approach” to governance, Heupel (2008, p. 
 
 
22) argues that doing so would have ultimately undermined confidence. As Early, Nance, 
and Cottrell (2017) note, “Enforcement as a collective policy of the Council seems off the 
agenda entirely. Hardly the command-and-control, top-down model of regulation that its 
extraordinary legal foundation seemed to foreshadow, the resolution establishes standards 
but allows for flexibility in how states meet them” (p. 96). 
In fact, there is a significant vein of scholarship that is cautiously optimistic about 
the resolution’s progress and the success of a soft-governance approach. Despite concerns 
over the resolutions vague language and the possibility for an even more fragmented 
international system of national export controls, bilateral assistance has helped the regime 
to overcome many the resolution’s initial criticisms. Since 2004, states’ implementation 
of UNSCR 1540 requirements have varied significantly, and according to the most recent 
UN implementation assessment, many states have yet to adhere to all of the mandates 
fully. One issue is that UNSCR 1540 does not prescribe specific legislation, but instead 
leaves it up to each member state to implement its obligations consistent with its own 
national political and economic systems. The last  assessment of 1540 implementation, 
which occurred in 2016, found that while states have made progress overall, several gaps 
remain. While seventy-percent of member states have implemented some national-level 
export control system for nuclear-related goods and technologies, less than fifty-percent 
of states have published controls lists, only thirty-percent of states have catch-all 
provisions, and about forty percent of states address transshipment (United Nations 
Security Council, 2016, pp. 61–70). 
There are two general explanations for states’ failures to comply with 1540 
obligations fully. The first, suggests that states see export controls as self-limiting and 
potentially harmful to economic and security interests. The second approach sees 
compliance failures as a function of limited capacity and capability—rather than political 
will. In an early study of national export control systems, Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama 
(2001) proposed a framework based on an economic-rationalist perspective to describe 
the conditions when states are likely to implement internationally compatible export 
controls. The framework explained why states implement export control systems in terms 
of maximizing the political and economic benefits of belonging to a liberal international 
community. The economic costs—particularly resource constraint—and political costs of 
administering a national export control system accounts for a “considerable portion of the 
policy variance” between countries (p. 74), rather than the particular government’s 
perception of external security threats posed by WMD-related illicit trade and 
proliferation. 
In a more recent study, Stinnett et al. (2011) draw from theories of international 
law to discuss states’ compliance with UNSCR 1540 from two perspectives: enforcement 
and capacity. Whereas the enforcement perspective explains compliance as a 
consequence of national interest and external pressures (Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, 
1996), the capacity perspective emphasizes limitations in the technical and bureaucratic 
 
 
capacities of governments (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). In an analysis of thirty countries, 
the authors found significant evidence to support the limited capacity explanation for 
states’ willingness to implement its UNSCR 1540 obligations (Stinnett et al., 2011, p. 
309). Moreover, the authors found no support for the hypothesis that states with 
economies that rely heavily on exports would have greater economic incentives not to 
implement 1540 obligations or the hypothesis that strategic partnerships with the United 
States are associated with "more aggressive nonproliferation efforts" (p. 323). These 
findings are consistent with an early study of UNSCR 1540 compliance by Fuhrmann 
(2007), who argues that compliance is strongly associated with both political willingness 
and capacity. 
Thus, from a governance perspective, non-compliance is easily addressed through 
bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts. In the United States, for example, the State 
Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS) has provided 
technical assistance, training, and outreach to more than sixty countries with varying 
degrees of success. However, this approach is still inadequate to address non-compliant 
and non-cooperative states. In fact, the United States has taken coercive tactics when 
presented with egregious issues of non-compliance. For example, the United Arab 
Emirates and Malaysia both implemented national export legislation in 2007 and 2010, 
respectively, but only after the threat of penalties by the United States.2 
We argue that as the United States publicly advocated for multilateral cooperation 
with respect to implementing and enforcing supply-side controls, policymakers began a 
concerted effort to expand extraterritorial methods to coerce non-compliant states and to 
disrupt overseas illicit procurement networks. In the next sections, we identify two 
factors that have significantly contributed to the United States' increased use of 
extraterritorial tools. First, global implementation of UNSCR 1540 obligations has been 
slow coming and varied and as consequence of these implementation shortfalls, 
transnational illicit procurement networks have been able to capitalize on governance and 
enforcement gaps between states. Second, over the last three decades, the United States 
has significantly expanded its view of jurisdiction, which in concert with new legislation 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks greatly expanded the arsenal of tools to use 
against those trafficking in WMD-related goods and technologies. 
Adaptive transnational illicit procurement networks create jurisdictional hurdles 
Illicit procurement networks—that is, the groups of intermediaries and middle 
responsible for procuring WMD-related goods and technologies--have featured 
prominently in recent cases of proliferation; helping proliferating states to obfuscate the 
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   For example, these included the risk of the UAE being designated a “Destination of Diversion 
Concern” under U.S. export control law, and the risk of Malaysia not being invited to Obama’s first 
Nuclear Security Summit in 2010.  
 
 
true end-user and evade potential detection and possible sanctions regimes. Iran and 
North Korea, for example, have consistently relied on transnational supplier networks to 
illicitly procure goods and technologies for use in their WMD and conventional military 
programs. Three characteristics of these networks make them particularly challenging for 
states and the UNSCR 1540 agenda to address: They operate in the grey market, are 
highly adaptable, and work across multiple jurisdictions. 
 
Operating in the Grey Market 
 
First, trafficking in dual-use goods and technologies is unlike many other types of 
transnational criminal activity because these illicit networks do not operate entirely on the 
“black market.” Rather, they occupy a space somewhere in between legitimate markets 
and grey markets. Generally, illicit procurement networks must buy from a legitimate 
supplier. Doing so requires the network to employ legitimate financial, shipping, and 
licensing procedures—or deceive other actors that they are doing so. This means that at 
least one end of any given transaction will appear entirely legitimate to regulators and 
enforcement agencies.  
Take, for example, the 2016 case of Sihai Cheng—a Chinese intermediary who 
illicitly procured thousands of export-controlled pressure sensors that ultimately made 
their way into Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.3 According to the U.S. criminal 
indictment and subsequent sentencing transcripts, between 2005 and 2012 Mr. Cheng 
established a series of front companies in order to pose as an end-user to receive the 
export-controlled parts from a U.S. manufacturer and supplier (U.S. District Court of 
Massachusetts, 2013). At the time, Cheng was working with the U.S. supplier’s 
subsidiary, which was based in Shanghai. This allowed Mr. Cheng to hide his illicit 
activities within completely legitimate channels of trade. In other words, the pressure 
sensors were fully licensed for export to Mr. Cheng’s front companies. From a detection 
and enforcement perspective, all of Mr. Cheng’s intra-office transactions appeared 
completely legitimate.  
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   Pressure sensors, also commonly referred to as “pressure transducers,” have a wide array of 




Ability to Adapt 
 
Second, illicit WMD procurement networks are not static groups of entities, but 
highly adaptable and can change their behavior to reflect environmental conditions–
whether changing political and economic realities, or to evade evolving approaches to 
enforcement. The speeds at which illicit networks can adapt frequently outstrips the 
speed at which enforcement agencies can respond. While this important feature has 
received little attention in the literature on WMD procurement networks, others have 
covered similar problems of adaptive networks concerning other types of transnational 
crime and terrorism. Kenney (2007), for example, shows that narcotics trafficking 
networks and terrorism networks adapt to supply-side controls as a survival mechanism 
in order to counter and evade enforcement actions. Kenney writes, “At their best, supply-
reduction programs have produced temporary ripples that quickly settle as traffickers 
establish alternative sources of supply, move their drug plantings and processing labs, 
invent new production methods, and create fresh transportation routes” (p. 2).  
North Korea’s illicit procurement and sanctions evasion networks have shown to 
be particularly adept at adapting to internal controls and evolving enforcement systems. 
The 2018 UN Panel of Experts report on North Korea, for example, notes that the country 
uses “increasingly sophisticated evasion practices” to undermine sanctions regimes 
(United Nations Security Council, 2018, p. 4). In a recent study, Park and Walsh (2016) 
argue that international sanctions have had the unintended consequence of actually 
improving Pyongyang’s sanctions-busting capability. As international sanctions increase 
the cost of doing business for North Korea, the country adapts by paying its networks of 
middlemen and intermediaries higher commissions and fees—a process that monetizes 
risk (Park & Walsh, 2016, p. 32). These findings are broadly consistent with prior 




Third, this ability to adapt is also reflected in their operation across multiple 
jurisdictions around the world. The evolving geography of these networks as they 
respond to different political, legal, regulatory, and enforcement environments has been 
noted (Hastings, 2012). While often sourcing technology from industry in advanced 
economies, these networks often conduct their operations in “third country” hubs to 
obscure the end user and avoid enforcement action (Salisbury, 2019). These networks, 
therefore, exercise a type of “jurisdictional arbitrage”—picking jurisdictions which are 
less regulated and with a lower willingness or ability to enforce (Williams, 2001, p. 71). 
If corresponding national export control legislation and enforcement mechanisms do not 
 
 
similarly adapt, procurement networks can exploit the resulting gaps (Arnold, 2017). 
These factors have made illicit procurement networks truly global in nature. One recent 
study indicated that in 2017, North Korea had offshore operations in fifty-two countries 
(Albright, Burkhard, Lach, & Stricker, 2018). Another noted that the country exploited 
more than 60 foreign jurisdictions in its WMD and military procurement efforts up to 
2016 (King’s College London, Project Alpha, 2016, p. 13). As a result, countering illicit 
networks has become a global game of “cat and mouse” or “whack-a-mole”—with each 
transfer playing out across several foreign jurisdictions, and interested national 
authorities struggling to keep up and act against these networks activities. 
Given these three features of illicit WMD procurement networks—operating in 
grey markets, the ability to adapt rapidly, and choose jurisdictions—conventional 
approaches to supply-side controls, especially those mandated by UNSCR 1540, are 
insufficient. When it comes to non-cooperative jurisdictions, enforcement becomes all the 
more difficult. In these cases, it becomes more likely that countries, like the United 
States, will resort to extraterritorial measures. 
The United States expands its jurisdiction across the globe 
 
International interpretations of jurisdiction vary significantly. Most countries base 
their interpretation of jurisdiction on one or more of four general principles. The first 
principle defines jurisdiction in terms of geographic territory (Kelsen, 1945, p. 208). Over 
the last several decades, however, economic globalization and the rise of international 
non-governmental organizations have reduced the relevancy of a territory-oriented 
principle of jurisdiction in most cases (Alexander, 2009, p. 68; Slaughter, 1997). The 
most commonly adopted principle is the nationality principle, which extends jurisdiction 
over citizens no matter their geographic location. Some countries, like the United States 
and Canada, have interpreted the nationality principle in a rather broad context to include 
citizens, companies, and property. This includes foreign companies that are owned or 
operated by U.S. entities, but otherwise located abroad, as well as companies that may 
only be partially owned by U.S. entities. 
The last two legal dimensions of jurisdiction are the protective and universal 
principles. The protective principle is based on the belief that sovereign states have the 
right to protect their economic and security interests (Alexander, 2009, p. 85). In this 
respect, claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction is consistent with international legal norms, 
but is substantively and arbitrarily defined by each state in terms of what constitutes a 
threat. Lastly, states may claim extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to enforce universal 
rights, which is mainly concerned with state violations of international law on slavery, 
piracy, and human rights. 
Problems quickly emerge, however, when a citizen of one country violates the 
law or threatens the security and safety of nationals in a foreign country. Under these 
 
 
circumstances, international norms have generally held that the extraterritorial application 
of domestic law must be through the consent of the state (i.e., the foreign jurisdiction). In 
practice, extraterritorial enforcement is conducted through multilateral or bilateral 
extradition agreements. Another issue arises when jurisdictional claims by one state 
create confusing or contradictory obligations for an individual or company headquartered 
in a foreign country. In other words, what happens when complying with one state's laws 
comes into conflict with another state's domestic laws? 
 In the United States, several legislative and regulatory changes between 1977 and 
2001 significantly expanded the scope of jurisdiction and the scale of extraterritorial 
enforcement activities. In 1979, for example, Congress passed the Export Administration 
Act, which gives the president authority to regulate the import and export of goods for 
national security purposes. Because Congress failed to specify its intent as to what 
jurisdiction entailed, presidents have subsequently taken a rather broad interpretation to 
include property (Solensky, 1986, p. 126). 
The most significant changes to U.S. extraterritorial policy occurred after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Congressional leaders determined that amendments 
to existing rules and regulations could help address jurisdictional gaps, especially when 
dealing with terrorist financing. Administrative and statutory reforms under the 2001 
USA PATRIOT Act ushered in a new era of “financial warfare” that leveraged the 
strength of the U.S. financial system to address security threats ranging from terrorism 
and WMD proliferation to human rights violations and narcotics trafficking. According to 
Juan Zarate (2013), a former Bush administration Treasury official and one of the key 
architects of these strategies, “[t]he twenty-first century financial and commercial 
environment had its own ecosystem that could be leveraged uniquely to American 
interests" (p. 151). In other words, when it comes to global trade and commerce, the U.S. 
dollar remains the leading global reserve currency, as well as the preferred denomination 
for trade, which proved to be an opportune choke-point. The critical point of departure 
from past strategies rested in the administration's policy to leverage the global financial 
system to target specific actors. In a sense, this represented a significant expansion in the 
interpretation of jurisdiction, which previous administrations generally avoided.4 
As the A.Q. Khan network began to unravel in 2003, the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury looked to its counter-terrorist financing playbook for strategies to block 
proliferators and would-be proliferators from financing their illicit activities. One of the 
                                               
4
   In 1982, for example, the French government ordered its largest oil and natural gas 
manufacturers to proceed with shipments to the Soviet Union in direct violations of U.S. sanctions— 
mainly as a protest to America's extraterritorial application of its domestic law. Amidst a rising tide of 
protests from key economic partners, President Reagan rolled back the extraterritorial dimensions of these 
sanctions (Perlow, 1983). 
 
 
first tests came in September 2005, when the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) declared a small Macanese-based bank—Banco Delta Asia—to be a 
“jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act for substantially contributing to North Korea’s illicit financial activities 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2005).5 Under this authority, FinCEN can require U.S. 
financial institutions to implement one or more “special measures” designed to deny bad 
actors access to the U.S. financial system. Such special measures can include maintaining 
certain detailed records, obtaining true beneficial ownership information, identifying 
correspondent customers, and the most serious, denying U.S. institutions from opening 
certain correspondent or pass-through accounts.6 In addition to the designation under 
Section 311, U.S. authorities also froze $25 million linked to the North Korean regime.7 
The unintended effect of Banco Delta Asia’s designation and the subsequent asset freeze 
was significant, swift, and widespread. Fearing damage to reputation and losing access to 
U.S. banking systems, financial institutions around the world cut ties with the Macanese 
bank almost overnight.  
Although the U.S. Government has used Section 311 designations sparingly, they 
demonstrated the power of U.S. financial pressure and provided a template to target the 
financing of proliferation, as well as a means to disrupt illicit procurement activities and 
rogue regimes. In late 2016, for example, the Trump administration used the authorities 
to target North Korea’s offshore banking networks—mainly located in China—which the 
regime used to maintain its illegal access to the global financial system. Under the 2016 
ruling, U.S. authorities prohibited American banks from opening or maintaining any 
correspondent account with Bank of Dandong—a small China-based bank—or any 
                                               
5
   Previous Section 311 designations were primarily related to terrorism or other types of 
transnational crime. 
6
   Correspondent banking is when one bank carries out transactions on behalf of another bank - 
usually a foreign bank. These relationships allow a customer at one institution to quickly send a payment to 
a foreign bank. For example, Bank of China would settle a payment from an account holder at Bank of 
New York by debiting Bank of New York's correspondent account and credit its client. If, say, Bank of 
China and Bank of New York did not have a correspondent relationship, the transaction might need to go 
through multiple correspondent accounts at different banks (i.e., a correspondent network). 
7
   The United States later allowed the $25 million to be unfrozen and transferred out of Banco 




international bank that does so. Bank of Dandong held several accounts for Korea Mining 
Development Corporation (KOMID), which the United States and the United Nations 
sanctioned for being a primary exporter of goods and technologies relating to ballistic 
missiles and conventional arms.8 
In order to address the financing of proliferation concerns more directly, President 
Bush signed Executive Order 13382 in June 2005, which provided the legal authority for 
the Department of State, in consultation with Department of the Treasury, to block assets 
and transactions of any individual or company.9 Once Treasury Department adds an 
entity to its sanctions list, U.S. businesses are prohibited from engaging in any 
transactions—with few exceptions—and block (i.e., confiscate or freeze) any property or 
transaction within the United States.10  
Even given the broad range and scope of the U.S. arsenal of financial weaponry, 
jurisdictional hurdles can still prove challenging. For example, North Korean illicit 
networks operating in foreign jurisdictions, like China, face little threat from U.S. 
regulatory and legal authorities—especially if the entities use small, regional banks with 
few ties to U.S. institutions. Recently, however, the U.S. Department of Justice has taken 
concerted steps to leverage national civil legal authorities to disrupt overseas networks 
that would otherwise be considered outside of U.S. legal jurisdiction. 
The legal basis to leverage U.S. civil courts is quite clever. The International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act is also a predicate offense for money laundering—that 
is, intentionally hiding the proceeds from illicit activity. Thus, if a company or individual 
violates IEEPA, they could also be charged with a money laundering offense. Under U.S. 
law, money laundering includes both criminal and civil penalties. The most notable, of 
course, is asset forfeiture. The latter provides significant leverage for U.S. authorities to 
target the finances of overseas networks by employing a little-known provision of the 
USA PATRIOT Act. 
                                               
8
   The U.S. government designated KOMID under executive orders 13382, 13687 in July 2005, 
and  UNSCR 1718 (2006) in April 2009.   
9
   The Executive Order states, “...engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that 
have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), 
including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use such items, by any 
person or foreign country of proliferation concern” (“Executive Order 13382,” 2005). 
10
   Some exceptions include academic exchanges, educational materials, humanitarian aid.  
 
 
One of the key reforms in the USA PATRIOT Act was to amend U.S. forfeiture 
statutes to include interbank (i.e., correspondent) accounts.11 In other words, prosecutors 
can indirectly seize proliferator assets held overseas by targeting the foreign bank's 
accounts in the United States. To date, however, U.S. prosecutors have been somewhat 
reluctant to fully leverage these authorities to target North Korean or Iranian illicit 
proceeds. There have been only five such instances.12 The most recent cases of civil asset 
forfeiture involve targeting North Korea’s networks of intermediaries and financiers that 
allow the regime to evade international sanctions and access the global financial system. 
In September 2016, U.S. prosecutors brought a civil case against Dandong Hongxiang 
Industrial Development (DHID) in the District of New Jersey for violating IEEPA and 
conspiracy to commit IEEPA violations.  
According to the criminal complaint, Ma Xiaohong and her top executives 
established more than twenty-two front companies around the world to help North 
Korea’s Kwangson Banking Corp., which was sanctioned in 2009 for its role in evading 
financial sanctions in order to facilitate dual-use procurement (U.S. District Court of New 
Jersey, 2016). Using shell companies registered in secrecy jurisdictions like Seychelles 
and the British Virgin Island, DHID acted as a payment processor for U.S. dollar-
denominated transactions on behalf of North Korean banks. Under the civil forfeiture 
action, U.S. prosecutors seized $74 million from twenty-five separate bank accounts at 
several Chinese banks.13 These banks ranged considerably in size from large national 
institutions to small regional banks. Most importantly, however, each held correspondent 
                                               
11
   Explicitly the code states, “if funds are deposited into an account at a foreign bank, and that 
foreign bank has an interbank account in the United States with a covered financial institution...the funds 
shall be deemed to have been deposited into the interbank account in the United States, and any restraining 
order, seizure warrant, or arrest warrant in rem regarding the funds may be served on the covered financial 
institution, and funds in the interbank account, up to the value of the funds deposited into the account at the 
foreign bank, may be restrained, seized, or arrested” (The USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). 
12
   Of the five civil cases, four have been against North Korean networks. These have included: 
Mingzheng International Trading Limited, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development, Velmur 
Management, and Dandong Chentai Trading Limited. 
13
   These included China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Bank of 
Communications Co. of China, Bank of Dandong, China Construction Bank, Guangdong Development 
Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of Dalian, Bank of Jinzhou, Hua Xia Bank, and 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation. 
 
 
relationships with U.S. institutions, where prosecutors were able to serve the seizure 
warrants.  
Administrative innovations have also emerged in addition to targeted sanctions 
and legal actions. In March 2017, ZTE Corporation, China’s largest telecommunications 
equipment manufacturer, agreed to $1.9 billion in criminal and civil penalties for illegally 
shipping U.S.-origin telecommunications equipment to Iran and North Korea (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2018a, 2018b). The most significant action, however, was not 
the criminal and civil penalty, but the seven-year suspended denial of export privileges. 
Meaning, if ZTE Corp. breached its agreements with prosecutors, the Department of 
Commerce would deny the company its ability to directly or indirectly import technology 
from the United States. Consequently, any U.S. person or company would be prohibited 
from transacting with ZTE for seven years— potentially upending a lucrative market 
worth billions and possibly even leading to the company's bankruptcy. In this context, the 
Department of Commerce leveraged its administrative authorities to coerce a major 
multi-national corporation— ultimately disrupting North Korea and Iran’s ability to 
procure telecommunications equipment with U.S. origin components.14 Thus far, ZTE 
Corp. is the only known instance where U.S. officials targeted a foreign company for 
sanctions violations using Department of Commerce administrative procedures.15 
Taken together, it is clear U.S. extraterritorial approaches to counterproliferation 
are not the result of a singular policy decision, but a consequence of a change 
international security threat, the lack of an international mechanism to enforce 1540 
implementation, and a history of expanding views on jurisdiction. In the next section, we 
conclude by exploring the potential challenges and consequences of the United States 
continuing to pursue unilateral and extraterritorial enforcement with respect to global 
nonproliferation goals and objectives. 
                                               
14
   In April 2018, Department of Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross revoked ZTE's suspended 
status and imposed a denial of export privileges order on ZTE for making false statements and misleading 
the U.S. Government during its negotiations in 2016. It is important to note, however, that the rationale for 
imposing the denial order was likely linked to a political dispute between the Trump administration and 
China over trade tariffs (Swanson, 2018). 
15
   Controversy erupted in December 2018, when Canadian officials arrested a top executive at 
Huawei—a large Chinese telecommunications company—at the request of U.S. authorities. The United 
States accused the executive of violating U.S. unilateral sanctions against North Korea and Iran.  
 
 
U.S. extraterritorial counterproliferation efforts: Challenges and consequences 
Despite the perceived power of extraterritorial enforcement efforts, it is not clear 
whether such efforts are effective. To date, there has been no systematic analysis of 
whether extraterritorial tools are an effective or practical approach to countering 
proliferation networks. First, the number of cases that can be considered extraterritorial is 
rather small compared to the entire universe of proliferation-related cases. Second, 
because the number of cases is small, it is nearly impossible to distinguish specific 
effects. The recent civil asset forfeitures against North Korean financial networks, for 
example, netted almost $90 million. This is not an insignificant amount, especially to the 
operators and intermediaries within each network. Regarding the overall effect on North 
Korea's off-shore illicit economy, the $90 million represents a fraction of the regimes' 
currency reserves, which reports estimate to be approximately $3-5 billion (C4ADS, 
2017; Thompson, 2017). 
The case of Karl Li—the Chinese serial proliferator responsible for selling 
restricted goods to Iran's ballistic missile program—also illustrates the complexities of 
understanding the effect of disruption operations. Li remains at large, despite a $5 million 
reward for his arrest—the most ever offered in a proliferation case. Of course, it is 
unknown whether this is the result of his supposed connections to Chinese government 
officials or an overall lack of information permeation in China where he is based. After 
Mr. Li's indictment and subsequent asset forfeiture, there was little in the way of 
reporting in Chinese news outlets. This, of course, begs the question of whether or not 
information and rewards systems can be useful overseas, or in information-constrained 
environments, like China? Finally, there is little evidence to suggest that Mr. Li has 
ceased his operations. In fact, as recent as April 2018, a company affiliated with Li 
posted job advertisements for vacancies in his factories—suggesting that at least some of 
his business activities are ongoing. 
Politically, opting for unilateral and extraterritorial tactics over multilateral 
consensus is not always the wisest choice. Surely, as others have pointed out, the benefits 
of multilateralism promote a shared commitment to international norms. Moreover, 
unilateralism can also provoke unwanted responses from needed allies. As Nye (2003, p. 
105) noted, beyond being insufficient or failing, unilateral approaches will often 
“generate reactions”—not always in the best interest of the United States. There is 
emerging evidence to suggest that states are reacting that undermine both U.S. and 
international nonproliferation interests.  
Extraterritorial use of legal and regulatory tools to disrupt illicit procurement 
networks requires a broad interpretation of jurisdiction. In some respects, this has had the 
unintended effect of reducing cooperative nonproliferation efforts. China, for example, 
has consistently opposed U.S. unilateral actions against its citizens. After the designation 
and asset forfeitures against Karl Li in 2014, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry 
chided the United States for its actions and suggested it would harm future joint 
 
 
nonproliferation efforts between the two countries (Gladstone, 2014). In August 2017, 
when the Trump administration imposed sanctions against a number of Chinese and 
Russian individuals and companies responsible for facilitating North Korea’s access to 
the international financial system, Chinese officials issued a statement that, “China 
opposes unilateral sanctions out of the U.N. Security Council framework, especially the 
‘long-arm jurisdiction’ over Chinese entities and individuals exercised by any country in 
accordance with its domestic laws” (Morello & Whoriskey, 2017). In the case of ZTE 
Corp., China warned that it was “prepared to take action to protect the interests of 
Chinese firms” (Freifeld & Jiang, 2017; Stecklow, Freifeld, & Jiang, 2018). Perversely, 
countries that would stand to benefit most from cooperation and capacity building are 
also the most likely targets of expanded U.S. unilateral disruption efforts—potentially 
compounding this inherent tension in the U.S. approaches. 
In 2017, the Chinese government adopted new, national-level export control laws 
that address many of the gaps the country has been criticized for in the past—including, 
establishing national enforcement mechanisms and delineating the differences between 
proliferation-sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. Interestingly, the text of the 
export control law seemingly addresses China's frustrations with foreign states' 
extraterritorial practices. The law articulates explicitly the right to retaliate against 
foreign states that take “discriminatory measures” against Chinese businesses and 
interests (“China prepares for new export control law,” 2017). Clearly, “overuse” of 
unilateral tactics to disrupt illicit WMD procurement may expose U.S. economic and 
political interest to foreign retribution—ultimately undermining the capability to use 
them in the future, either through making the tools less effective or raising the political 
costs of their use. Furthermore, continued unilateral counterproliferation efforts may 
comprise existing political will to cooperate with the U.S. on future nonproliferation 
efforts, increases the potential for retribution by foreign states, and diminishes the utility 
of the tool itself—that is, the more these tools are used, the less useful they can become. 
Over the last decade, U.S. policymakers have increasingly viewed sanctions and 
other extraterritorial actions as cost-effective, low-risk, and reproducible policy 
instruments while ignoring inherent hazards. These hazards become significant when 
extraterritorial enforcement actions are carried out without broad international consensus 
on the larger objectives. In effect, extraterritorial enforcement unmitigated economic 
coercion policies muddy the waters—making each practically indistinguishable from one 
another and sending confusing signals to allies.  
Consequently, states have become increasingly alarmed at the expansion of U.S. 
extraterritoriality and politicization of the international financial system. The Obama 
Administration's "whisper campaign" among European banks to isolate Iran was effective 
because the United States made clear that pressuring Iran was part of a broader 
engagement strategy to achieve a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. By 
contrast, the Trump administration has exhibited a strong preference for unilateralism in 
 
 
its foreign policy, such as its withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—
the 2015 agreement between the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
China, Russia, and Germany) and Iran, which limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange 
for lifting international sanctions. In re-imposing financial and economic sanctions, 
President Trump has threatened to use secondary sanctions against European allies who 
do not end their business ties with Iran. This has prompted a series of political responses 
from European leaders, suggesting the need to insulate the European Union's economic 
interests and activities from American extraterritoriality.16 
Although the reach of U.S. extraterritorial enforcement is significant, countries 
are not without options to resist. In recent years, several states have moved to insulate 
themselves against exposure to U.S. sanctions. China and Russia, for example, have each 
developed alternative payment systems in order to avoid dollar-dominated systems. 
Global companies are also seeking to limit their exposure to U.S. sanctions by exiting 
high-risk jurisdictions that may incur additional scrutiny by the United States— a process 
dubbed "de-risking." The risk that U.S. countermeasures will eventually undermine U.S. 
credibility and weaken extraterritorial enforcement is not insignificant. 
Conclusion 
 In this article, we attempt to explain why the United States has increasingly 
resorted to extraterritorial counterproliferation enforcement efforts despite a consensus on 
the need for a multilateral approach to supply-side controls. We then explore the potential 
consequences of extraterritorial enforcement on broader nonproliferation objectives. We 
find that U.S. extraterritorial enforcement of counterproliferation policies is a 
consequence of the jurisdictional challenges posed by non-state actors, broad expansions 
in domestic legal interpretations of jurisdiction, and continuing gaps in global supply-side 
controls. While extraterritorial actions have targeted only a select number of states–
namely China–it is increasingly clear that U.S. enforcement actions can jeopardize and 
even undermine multilateral commitments nonproliferation efforts–like UNSCR 1540.   
On the surface, the U.S. approach to “going it alone” in certain hard cases of illicit 
procurement suggests that the Security Council’s approach to governance was not 
without its limitations as some had originally predicted. In other words, the seemingly 
soft approach to governance–that is, not providing for an international enforcement 
                                               
16
   The European Commission amended a 1996 regulation, known as the Blocking Statute, meant to 
insulate European companies against American secondary sanctions against Cuba, Libya, and Iran. In 
principle, the Blocking Statute shields against U.S. extraterritoriality by providing a legal indemnification 
for EU companies and individuals. That is, the statute provides a legal basis for E.U. entities to not comply 
with U.S. measures by nullifying the effect, within the EU, of any foreign decision based on extraterritorial 
legislation (e.g., U.S. secondary sanctions). 
 
 
mechanism–did in fact open the door to coercive and extraterritorial enforcement. As a 
consequence, as we demonstrate, U.S. unilateral actions may be pushing states to insulate 
and mitigate against exposure to extraterritorial enforcement. Moreover, it is clear that 
U.S. policy has not fully weighed the costs of its extraterritorial enforcement actions 
against its impact to the 1540 regime. Given current geopolitical trends, however, it is 
likely that the United States will continue to leverage—or possibly expand—the use of 
these tools. The next comprehensive review by the 1540 committee is not until 2021. In 
the meantime, it will be important for the committee to explore the impact of 
extraterritorial enforcement on states’ implementation. A richer picture may help 
illuminate policy options that are more consistent with the regime’s approach to 
governance. Also, U.S. decisionmakers must reconcile the need for a greater multilateral 
approach to illicit WMD procurement with the need to enforce domestic rules and 
regulations. Instead, preference should be given to options that make use of official legal 
procedures while adhering to international rules and norms and should continue to 
reaffirm its commitments to multilateral approaches to supply-side controls by increasing 
outreach, capacity-building, and technical training to developing countries. 
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